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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact on prices of various regulatory changes in residents’ flight 
subsidies implemented in Spain in recent years. It draws on a large sample of domestic 
routes for the period 2003-2013 to estimate a price equation that accounts for the panel 
data and the potential endogeneity of specific explanatory variables. Price differences were 
not found between the treated routes (routes affected by the discounts) and the control 
routes (routes not affected by the discounts). This is the case regardless of the discount 
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1. Introduction 
Air transportation is key in supporting mobility around cities and regions that are located in 
peripheral or remote locations. However, as demand for routes serving peripheral locations 
may be low, airlines may provide less frequent and more expensive services there, or may 
not even offer any service at all (Bitzan and Junwook, 2006; Fageda, 2013). It is widely 
recognized in the literature that high-density economies in the airline industry (Caves et al., 
1984; Brueckner and Spiller, 1994) may help airlines save costs by operating on denser 
routes with larger planes at higher load factors. 
The traditional way of dealing with this problem in the European Union has been to 
subsidize the population living in peripheral communities or to apply price discounts to 
specific routes. Furthermore, these subsidies may be accompanied by the imposition of 
public services obligations (PSO) that put limits on the frequency of service, the size of the 
aircraft, the schedule for the service, and, on occasions, the maximum permitted fare for 
some or all seats. 
In this regard, several European national and regional governments have introduced 
sizeable air service discount schemes that benefit island residents on domestic routes that 
have islands as their endpoints. These discounts are financed by governments, which 
subsidize the price paid by island residents. As they are not embedded in PSO regulations 
(i.e. they are independent), they can also include additional price reductions. Examples of 
this type of policy can be found in France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom.  
In particular, populations from outlying regions1 enjoy these kinds of subsidies because 
the government is seeking to promote territorial equity. Because these regions are 
geographically very distant from the European continent, they benefit from specific 
legislation like this, in order to be protected.2 In particular, there are differences in the form 
of the grant, and even in the type of the subsidy (they are predominantly specific or ad-
valorem). 
Although these subsidies are economically significant, as far as is known the relevant 
literature has not focused on its corresponding importance. Moreover, the analysis of the 
policies to support air services in remote regions is generally made under the terms of the 
                                                 
1 In the EU there are nine Outermost Regions: Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique, La Réunion, 
Mayotte (French overseas departments); Saint-Martin (French overseas collectivity); Madeira and Azores 
(Portuguese autonomous regions) and the Canary Islands (Spanish autonomous community). 
2 In the words of the European Commission: “These specific measures are designed to address the challenges 
faced by the Outermost Regions because of their remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult topography and 
climate, and economic dependence on a few products” See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/themes/outermost-regions/ 
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public service obligation (PSO) declaration.3 In this regard, several studies have analyzed 
the design and effects of the PSO applied in different European countries. Williams and 
Pagliari (2004) and Merkert and O’Fee (2013) identify vast diversity in the instruments and 
selection of protected routes across Europe. Lian (2010) and Lian and Ronnevik (2011) 
assess the weaknesses of the PSO regulation implemented in Norway, while Di Francesco 
and Pagliari (2012) analyze the potential negative impact on airfares of eliminating PSOs on 
the routes connecting the Italian mainland to the island of Sardinia. Calzada and Fageda 
(2014) find that PSOs reduce competition on the protected routes, while their effect on the 
number of flights differs depending on national regulations.  
Furthermore, some studies have examined the effects of PSOs on the efficiency of 
operators. Santana (2009) finds that PSOs increase the operation costs of European 
carriers, but she does not observe a similar effect in the US system. Merkert and Williams 
(2013) show that European operators perform better in the early months of the PSO 
contracts than when the contract is approaching termination, suggesting that airlines have 
fewer incentives to increase efficiency before the tender finishes due to the absence of 
competition. Finally, some other papers have examined the design of PSOs in European air 
markets. Pita et al. (2013) propose an operational planning model to examine the design of 
subsidized air transportation, and apply this methodology to assess the Azores PSO system; 
while Pita et al. (2014) extended this model and apply it to an analysis of the PSO network 
in Norway. 
Less attention has been paid to the analysis of price discounts established for residents 
on islands out of PSOs regulations. In Spain, Calzada and Fageda (2012) show that routes 
benefiting from price discounts are priced more highly than the remainder of the domestic 
routes. Fageda et al. (2012) draws on data of routes departing from Gran Canaria airport, 
including national and international destinations. They compare prices on subsidized routes 
(domestic flights from Gran Canaria) with those that are unsubsidized (international flights 
from Gran Canaria), and find that non-resident passengers pay higher prices than 
international passengers. 
Valido et al. (2014) compare the different effects of ad-valorem and specific subsidies for 
resident passengers in air transport markets in a 'market power context'. They show that 
non-resident passengers may be spelled from the market if the proportion of resident 
passengers is high enough. They also analyze the most desirable situation between both 
types of subsidies, ad-valorem or specific, showing that their effects depend on the 
                                                 
3 In a more general perspective, Nolan et al. (2005) examine the social welfare implications of different 
regulations: direct subsidies, protected route packages, and revenue guarantees. 
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passengers' willingness to pay. Finally, they apply the model to the Canary Island markets, 
concluding that the ad-valorem subsidy is not the best for the conditions of this market. 
Finally, Cabrera et al. (2011) carry out a comparative description of these kinds of subsidies 
in European outermost regions (they also analyzed PSO declarations in these regions)  
This paper contributes to the literature on price discounts to island residents by 
examining the impact on prices of different regulatory changes implemented in Spain in 
recent years. We draw on a large sample of domestic routes (including routes both affected 
and unaffected by the discounts) for the period 2003-2013 to estimate a price equation that 
accounts for the panel data of our sample and potential endogeneity of some explanatory 
variables.  
Previous papers about the impact on prices of discounts have simply distinguished 
between subsidized and unsubsidized routes. Here, the change in the amount of the 
discount offered in the period under study can be exploited. Specifically, the percentage of 
price discount that island residents can benefit from has increased gradually from 33% to 
50% during the considered period. Hence, we can examine not just price differences 
between subsidized and unsubsidized routes but also the differential impact of the amount 
of the subsidy on prices (without discounts) by separately identifying the effect of three 
different regulatory changes. 
In the following section, the price discount policy applied in Spain to protect island 
residents and its historical evolution is explained. Next, suggestions based on the data are 
put forward and descriptive statistics are provided. In the last section, the empirical strategy 
is developed and the results of the econometric analysis are shown. Finally, the paper 
concludes with some policy recommendations. 
2. Subsidy scheme in Spain 
In Spain, subsidies for resident passengers from specific territories have been common 
practice. The first application of legislation in this regard was in 1960 and the last 
modification in 2005.4 The main objective has always been the same, which is territorial 
equity, and the type of subsidy has also been an invariant ad-valorem subsidy, i.e. a 
percentage of the discount on the final price paid by the resident passenger. 
In particular, the ad-valorem subsidy is a common aspect of the successive legislation 
changes, but there have been some changes in the percentage of discount. Moreover, the 
                                                 
4 In fact, there have been other changes in legislation (even after this one) that affects other aspects of the 
resident subsidy theme. However, we only take into account the legislation that modifies the percentage of 
the subsidy. 
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legislation has modified various aspects of the conditions that merit the subsidy, and 
detailed the maximum amount available, the way to gain accreditation, and so on. 
Subsidies began in 1960, when pre-democratic legislation introduced an air transport 
subsidy for residents who lived in the Canary Islands because of “…rising ticket prices…”, 
adding that “…it would not be fair that airlines suffer the reduction in ticket prices…”. 
However this only lasted one year (1961), as in mid-1962 legislation changed the percentage 
to 33% and the residence of the passengers entitled to the subsidy (to Spanish Sahara and 
Ifni). 
Following these first applications in air transport, many changes were introduced, such 
as the addition of other affected territories (Balearic Islands, Ceuta and Melilla) or the 
transport mode (maritime), among others, as has been mentioned above.5 
The percentage of the subsidy, whose changes are analyzed in this paper, has been 50% 
since 2007, but it has focused on the airline industry and in the case of the Canary Islands, 
this percentage has experienced variations. In this regard, this paper distinguishes between 
inter-island trips and the connection of the Canary Islands with the rest of the Iberian 
mainland 
On the one hand, the percentage for inter-island routes has increased from 10% (in 
application from January 1988 to August 1998), to 33% (in application from August 1998 
to February 2005), 38% (in application from February to December 2005), to 45% (2006) 
and to 50% (in application from January 2007 to date). 
On the other hand, regarding connections with the rest of the country, the percentage 
has been increased from 12% (1961), to 33% (from 1962 to February 2005), to 38% (in 
application from February to December 2005), to 45% (2006) and to 50% (in application 
from January 2007 to date). 
Concerning the maximum amount of subsidy per passenger, the legislation states that: 
“in no case can the subsidy reach the greatest fare of the rates involving business class fares 
on air transport services”. Furthermore, the subsidy cannot be applied to tickets that 
include trips outside national territory. 
In order to be entitled to the subsidy, the passenger has to facilitate relevant data to the 
airline and immediately receives the discount on the price. Next, the airline directly obtains 
                                                 
5 Other changes can be extracted from the legislation (for example, the maximum amount per passenger, the 
accreditation of residence, and so on) but the economic consequences of these changes are not relevant to 
this paper. 
6 
 
the money from the government. The amount of air transport subsidies in 2016 
demonstrate its importance: it represents over €358 million of the Spanish budget.6 Various 
pieces of legislation related to subsidies are summarized in table 1, taking into account only 
the differences in percentages, territory and transport mode. 
 
                                                 
6 See “Presupuestos generales del Estado 2016. Programa 441O Subvenciones y apoyo al transporte aéreo”. 
Available at: https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2015/10/30/pdfs/BOE-A-2015-11644.pdf 
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Table 1. Evolution of resident subsidies in Spain7 
Law 
Application 
Area 
Transport 
method 
Destination Percentage 
Law  
118/1960 
Canary Islands Air 
Rest of national 
territory 
12% 
DL 
22/1962 
Canary Islands, 
Ifni and 
Spanish Sahara  
Air 
Rest of national 
territory 
33% 
Law  
46/1981 
Balearic Islands 
Air and 
maritime 
Rest of national 
territory 
25% 
Air and 
maritime 
Between islands 10% 
Law  
33/1987 
Canary Islands, 
Ceuta and 
Melilla 
Air and 
maritime 
Rest of national 
territory 
33% 
Air and 
maritime 
Between islands 10% 
Law 
30/1998 
Balearic Islands 
Air and 
maritime 
Rest of national 
territory 
33% 
Between islands 
Generally applicable to 
the archipelagos of the 
Spanish State 
RD 
1745/1998 
Canary Islands 
Air and 
maritime 
Rest of national 
territory 
33% 
Air Between islands 33% 
Maritime Between islands 10% 
RD 
1746/1998 
Balearic Islands 
Air 
Rest of national 
territory 
33% 
Air Between islands 33% 
Maritime Between islands 10% 
RD 
207/2005 
Balearic 
Islands, Canary 
Islands, Ceuta 
and Melilla 
Air 
Rest of national 
territory 
38% 
Air Between islands 38% 
Maritime Between islands 15% 
Law 
30/2005 
Balearic 
Islands, Canary 
Islands, Ceuta 
and Melilla 
Air 
Rest of national 
territory 
45% 
Air Between islands 45% 
Maritime Between islands 22% 
Law 
42/2006 
Balearic 
Islands, Canary 
Islands, Ceuta 
and Melilla 
Air 
Rest of national 
territory 
50% 
Air Between islands 50% 
Maritime Between islands 25% 
Source: Own elaboration. 
                                                 
7 There is an autonomic legislation additional to National legislation in maritime transport. Nowadays, with 
these complements, the percentage of discount for this transport mode is the same as for the air transport. 
We do not analyze this legislation because it is irrelevant for air transport and therefore irrelevant in our 
work. 
8 
 
3. Data 
Our database contains more than 700 observations from 2003 to 2013 from 47 Spanish 
national routes. Two kinds of routes are identified: those where passengers may be entitled 
to the resident subsidy (inter-island and routes with origin or destination on an island) and 
those where passengers may not. 
This data structure allows an empirical strategy to be employed that is based on how the 
treated routes (those that are subsidized) change in relation with the control group (those 
routes that are not affected by subsidies). Two seasons (winter and summer) are also 
distinguished, meaning that any particular observation is identified by year (t) route (i) and 
season (s). 
Prices set by airlines at route level are generally modeled as a function of a set of route 
and carrier specific variables. Here, we exploit the variability across routes so that the focus 
is on route-specific variables. Taking this into account, prices can be understood as a mark-
up over costs. The main determinants of the mark-up are intensity of competition and 
demand on the route. The main determinants of route costs are distance and demand given 
the relevance of distance and density economies. Hence, our control variables are capturing 
those determinants of mark-ups and costs. Similar control variables have been used in a 
number of previous studies about prices in air transport market (see for example Berry et 
al., 1996; Borenstein, 1989; Brander and Zhang, 1990; Evans and Kessides, 1993; Dresner 
et al., 1996; Fageda, 2006; Fischer and Kamerschen, 2003; Hofer et al., 2008; Bilotkach and 
Lakew, 2014).  
All continuous variables are expressed in logs. The use of logs in continuous variables is 
common in studies about air fares. Note also that the variables of main interest in the 
analysis (variables for the change in the percentage of discounts over prices that island 
residents enjoy) are dummy variables. In this regard, the use of logs for the dependent 
variable has the advantage that the interpretation of the dummy variable coefficients are 
clearer as they are interpreted as the percentage change in prices associated with being 
affected by the discounts. 
Thus, the variables included in the database are: 
1. LnPriceits: is the natural logarithm of the price corresponding to the route i in the year t 
and season s. This is the dependent variable in our model. This variable is constructed as 
the lowest mean round trip price charged by airlines offering services weighted by their 
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corresponding market share. Information has been obtained manually from airlines 
websites for a sample week of the summer and winter season since 2003. Hence, this study 
draws on (at least for Europe) a unique database of historical prices (2003-2013).   
These homogeneous rules are followed in the data collection of prices. Price data 
relating to the city pair link (route) that has the city with the largest airport as its origin. 
Additionally, the price data has been collected one month before travelling, and the price 
refers to the first trip of the week, with the return being on Sunday. With this procedure, 
variability of data across routes can be exploited because data is obtained under 
homogeneous conditions for all the routes in our sample. To explain the corresponding 
price for each route we take as explanatory variables the following: 
2. Ln passengersit: the logarithm of the number of air passenger carried in those operations 
on route i during year t. Source: Spanish airport operator (AENA). The expected sign of 
the coefficient of this variable is ambiguous. More route traffic density may imply a better 
exploitation of density economies but higher demand levels may also lead airlines to charge 
higher mark-ups over costs. 
This variable may be showing an endogenous relationship with the dependent variable. 
So we implement an instrumental variables procedure in the estimation of equation [1] 
through the following variables: 
2.a. Populationit: the logarithm of the average population at origin and destination on route i 
during year t. Source: Spanish Statistical Institute (INE). 
2.b. Unemploymentit: the logarithm of the average rate of unemployment between origin and 
destination on route it in the year t. Source: Spanish Statistical Institute (INE) 
2.c. Barcelona / Madrid enlargement: two binary variables that take value 1 following the 
enlargement of these two majors airports. 
3. Ln competitorsit: logarithm of number of competitors on route i at year t . Source: AENA. 
This variable will allow us to measure the influence of the intensity of competition on 
prices charged by airlines. In the case that competition reduces prices charged by airlines, 
the sign of the coefficient associated to this variable should be negative. However, the 
variable for the number of competitors may also work as a proxy for the profitability of 
operating on the route as it may be correlated with levels of demand on the route or 
omitted factors that influence such profitability. 
10 
 
This variable may be showing an endogenous relationship with the dependent variable. 
So we have implemented an instrumental variables procedure in the estimation of equation 
[1] through the same variables as air passengers. 
4. Dit
Ryanair: binary variable that takes value 1 if Ryanair operates route i during period t. A 
negative sign is expected for the coefficient associated with this variable. Ryanair usually 
fixes very low charges, thus inducing other route competitors to reduce prices. Note here 
that Ryanair is the leading low-cost airline in Europe and it is generally able to operate with 
lower costs than its rivals. Hence, we may expect that the presence of Ryanair on the route 
may have a significant impact on prices charged on the route beyond the number of airlines 
offering services there. Source: own elaboration from AENA. 
5. Ln distancei: logarithm of the number of kilometers between origin and destination of the 
route i. Route length is a major determinant of airline costs and its coefficient is expected 
to be positive and lower than one. This means that the increase in costs is less than 
proportional to the increase in the number of kilometers flown. Long-haul routes involve 
higher average speeds, less intense consumption of fuel, and lower airport charges per 
kilometer. Source: Webflyer website (http://www.webflyer.com/). 
6. Difference-in-difference variables. Six variables are included in order to control the effect of 
the changes in the level of subsidies (33% to 38%, 38% to 45% and 45% to 50%) in the 
subsidized routes on the endogenous variable. Firstly, binary variables that take value 1 if 
the period is after the corresponding percentage of subsidy, for all routes (Dits
Period 38, Dits
Period 
45, Dits
Period50). Secondly, the relevant variables, binary variables that takes value 1 if the route 
is subsidized and the period is after the corresponding percentage of subsidy (DiDits
38, 
DiDits
45, DiDits
50). These variables show us the relative change of these treated routes 
regarding control group (routes without subsidies).  
Discounts given to island residents may have different effects on prices (without 
discounts). On the one hand, the discount should increase the amount of traffic on the 
route (by residents), although in our price equation this effect is captured by the demand 
variable. Second, it may increase prices since these discounts make the demand of island 
residents less elastic and, as a consequence, airlines can establish higher mark-ups. On the 
other hand, airlines may be forced to incorporate the subsidy into the price (without 
discount) if they are operating in a competitive context. Indeed, the subsidy may increase 
the number of airlines offering flights on the route given the increased demand. This effect 
can in part be captured by the variable 'number of competitors'. Overall, the subsidy may 
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have an effect both on demand and supply, so that the expected effect on airlines behavior 
is not clear a priori.  
Regardless of the impact of discounts on demand and supply, prices could be lower 
with the discounts as they imply the existence of two different types of passengers with 
varying willingness to pay. As the discount only affects one of the two types of passengers 
(the islands residents) resident demand increases but at the expense of non-resident 
passengers, who can be expelled from the market. This may lead to lower demand and 
prices. Ideally, we should capture this latter effect through variables that distinguish 
between residents and non-residents but unfortunately this information is not available. 
However, the comparison between subsidized and non-subsidized routes may indirectly 
capture such effect.  
In any case, we can also examine whether airlines react differently to different levels of 
subsidy, which is the main purpose of this analysis. In fact, this is the main added value of 
this study in contrast with previous papers that have examined the influence of discounts 
on prices.  
Table 2 includes some descriptive statistics from the database. We split each data on 
both subsidized (treated) and non-subsidized routes (control group). 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
Average 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
U-S S U-S S U-S S U-S S 
Price 175.99 301.20 109.8 267.5 19.9 24.6 840.36 1,836 
Passengers 558,173 570,172 695,433 473,048 49,287 66,169 4,842,969 1,775,715 
Population 1,382,391 1,235,050 898,406 411,377 549,690 915,262 5,552,050 2,581,147 
Unemployment 14.06 15.34 6.2 7.1 5.3 5.1 31.21 34.7 
Competitors 1.97 2.80 0.8 1.1 1 1 5 7 
Distance 549.11 926.61 195.9 704.9 284.6 119.2 893.52 2,193.3 
Source: Own elaboration. Note: U-S represents Unsubsidized routes. S represents Subsidized 
routes. 
 
Treated routes are on average more expensive, longer and have a higher number of 
competitors than those that are unsubsidized. In Table 3 we provide a preliminary analysis: 
what have been the changes in prices after each increase of the subsidy? We obtain the 
average prices for each period considering the differentiation between these two kinds of 
routes. 
 
Table 3. Average prices by period 
Route  
Period under 
33% 
Period under 38% Period under 45% Period under 50% 
Subsidized 
507.29 
(360.52) 
568.31 
(347.62) 
+12.0 
378.53 
(291.93) 
-33.4 
198.66 
(108.72) 
-47.5 
Non-
subsidized) 
249.49 
(125.45) 
310.77 
(163.75) 
+24.6 
194.04 
(82.56) 
-37.6 
152.03 
(77.15) 
-21.7 
Source: Own elaboration. Standard deviation among brackets. Bold numbers are the average rate 
change from previous period 
 
The average changes in prices do not show a clear pattern: in the first change prices 
increase less in treated groups than in the control group, which is a good indicator for 
consumers. But in the following two modifications prices decrease less than in the control 
group. These results obviously require a causal analysis in order to estimate the real effect 
on prices. 
4. Empirical strategy and results 
Our empirical strategy is based on the structure of the panel database. As we have 
previously mentioned, this includes 47 routes for the whole period, but in an unbalanced 
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panel. The latter is due to some new routes or others that have lost their scheduled air 
services in the period. Hence, we must employ an econometric technique in the context of 
the panel data framework.  
The second question to address is that there may be a simultaneous determination of 
the variables of demand and number of competitors, as mentioned above. Hence, the 
estimation is made using an Instrumental Variables estimator with panel data. 
This strategy requires the use of instruments that must be correlated with the 
instrumented variables and they should not be endogenous. In this regard, as noted above, 
we include the following variables as instruments of both variables: level of population, 
average rate of unemployment at origin and destination points and enlargement of Madrid 
and Barcelona´s airports. 
The empirical analysis is based on the estimation of the following pricing equation for 
the route i in year t and season s: 
LnPriceits  0  1LnPassengersit  2LnCompetitorsits  3Dts
Period38
4Dts
Period45  5Dts
Period50  6DiDits
38  7DiDits
45  8DiDits
50 
9LnDistancei  10Dits
Ryanair  its
  [1] 
 
Table 4 shows the results of the estimation of the pricing equation. The estimation is 
performed using two different techniques that take advantage of the panel nature of our 
data: the fixed route and random effects models. The use of either model allows us to 
consider unobserved route heterogeneity. 
An advantage of the fixed effects model is that it allows us to control for any omitted 
variables that correlate with the variables of interest and which do not change over time. As 
such, the fixed effects model is more reliable than other estimation techniques. However 
one shortcoming of the fixed effects model is that it may be less informative than other 
techniques because the effect of time-invariant variables cannot be identified. Indeed, the 
random effects model has the advantage that it may capture both the between and within 
variation of the data, while the fixed effect model only captures the within variation of the 
data. However, a disadvantage of the random effects model is related with the potential 
bias derived from the correlation between the explanatory variables and the random 
effects.  
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For this reason, the Hausman test is generally used to select the most appropriate 
estimation method. The Hausman test shows whether there are substantial differences 
between random and fixed effects. Given that the fixed effects model is always consistent 
but the random effects model is more efficient, if the test shows substantial differences 
between the random and fixed effects model then the fixed effects model is the most 
appropriate estimation method. In the case that substantial differences between the fixed 
and random effects model are not found, then the random effects model is the most 
appropriate choice. The Hausman test recommends using the random effects model, 
although we report the results of both methods for the sake of completeness. However, the 
discussion of results focuses on the random effects model. 
The overall explanatory power of the model is reasonably good with an R2 of 0.35. 
Results for the demand variable suggest that airlines may exploit density economics on 
denser routes. Indeed, the coefficient associated to the demand variable is negative and 
statistically significant. This result provides evidence in favor of one of the justifications for 
applying subsidies and other protection mechanisms in peripheral routes; the low demand 
that is typically found in peripheral routes implies that airlines must provide the service at 
high costs. 
We also find a positive relationship between the number of competitors and prices 
charged on the route. This result is surprising as we might expect that the number of 
competitors captures the intensity of competition on the route. One possible explanation 
for this result is that the demand variable may be capturing the exploitation of density 
economics by airlines, while the variable of number of competitors may be capturing the 
ability of airlines to set high mark-ups over costs and hence it could work as a proxy of the 
profitability of the route. 
In any case, another variable that may identify the intensity of competition on the route 
is that related with the presence of Ryanair. As mentioned above, Ryanair is the leading 
low-cost airline in Europe and usually offer flights with aggressive marketing at very low 
prices. Hence, the results of our analysis suggest that what it is relevant in terms of 
competition in the Spanish airline market is not the number of competitors but the identity 
of the competitors. Indeed, the coefficient associated to the variable of Ryanair is negative 
and statistically significant.  
We also find evidence of distance economics as the coefficient of the distance variable is 
positive and statistically significant, but lower than one. It will be recalled that distance 
economies in the air transport market are related with the fact that longer routes involve 
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higher average speeds, less intense consumption of fuel, and lower airport charges per 
kilometer. 
The main variables of our analysis are the difference–in-difference variables that are 
constructed by the interaction between the dummy variable for subsidized routes and the 
period after the corresponding percentage of subsidy. In contrast to previous studies, here 
we can identify whether an increase in the percentage of the subsidy has led to changes in 
prices (without discount). 
Results for this interaction variable shows that we do not find price differences between 
the treated routes (routes affected by the discounts) and the control routes (routes not 
affected by the discounts). This is the case regardless the percentage of discount on prices 
that island residents enjoy.  
The different subsidy effects mentioned above (changes in demand and supply) seem to 
offset each other. Therefore, the effect of subsidies on the price without subsidy appears to 
be complex, which could explain our result. In any case, a clear implication of this result is 
that island residents have taken advantage of the discounts through lower prices (with the 
discount) while non-residents are not harm by the discount policy as prices without the 
discount are not higher.  
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Table 4. Price equation using panel data estimations with instrumental variables 
Covariates Fixed effects Random effects 
Ln passengers -0.20 (0.47) -0.61 (0.16)*** 
Ln competitors 1.98 (0.53)*** 1.84 (0.51)*** 
Period under subsidy 38 -0.08 (0.17) 4e-4 (0.13) 
Period under subsidy 45 -0.60 (0.19)*** -0.44 (0.13)*** 
Period under subsidy 50 -1.14 (0.19)*** -0.92 (0.08)*** 
DiD under 38 0.11 (0.23) 0.06 (0.21) 
DiD under 45 0.37 (0.25) 0.26 (0.20) 
DiD under 50 -0.10 (0.13) -0.19 (0.12) 
Ryanair -0.98 (0.22)*** -1.02 (0.22)*** 
Ln distance  0.14 (0.07)** 
Constant 7.17 (5.83) 11.53 (2.14)*** 
Observations 727 727 
R2 (overall) 0.26 0.35 
Hausman test Prob>chi2=0.9757 
Note 1: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Standard errors among brackets. 
Note 2: Passengers and number of competitors have been estimated using the following 
instruments: average population between two cities, average rate of unemployment and 
enlargement of Madrid and Barcelona´s airports. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed the impact on prices of different levels of discounts to island 
residents using data drawn from a large sample of Spanish airline market routes. The results 
suggest that prices on subsidized routes are no different to prices on unsubsidized routes 
after controlling for demand, distance and the intensity of competition on the route. 
Furthermore, our analysis does not find a differential reaction of airlines to different levels 
of subsidy. Indeed, the subsidized routes have been affected by several regulatory changes 
that increased the percentage of discounts for island residents from 33% to 50%. Despite 
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the magnitude of the changes in the amount of the discount enjoyed by island residents, we 
have not found a significant difference in the level of prices (without the discount). Thus, 
our analysis shows that the discount policy seems to work as a subsidy to the island 
residents and not as a subsidy to the airlines, as the latter do not increase prices on 
subsidized routes. Furthermore, given that airlines do not increase prices on subsidized 
routes, non-residents are unaffected by the discount policy. 
Overall, the discount policy may be effective in reducing the costs of insularity and the 
long distance travel to/from the mainland for residents. Indeed, the discount policy may 
promote the mobility at national level of residents in islands, as airlines do not pass the 
increased demand to passengers through higher prices (without the discount). Having said 
this, the increased subsidy implies an increase in the amount of public resources devoted to 
protecting island residents. As noted above, Spanish governments spend more than €300 
million of the Spanish annual budget on air transport subsidies. 
Regarding this point, alternative policies could be implemented to protect passenger 
residents on islands, with a lower impact on the governmental budget. Some of these 
policies might include providing a specific subsidy that does not depend on ticket price, 
applying a price-cap or favorable tax treatment for specific routes (although competition 
policy rules must work in this specific case), or subsidize the airline instead of subsidizing 
the passenger. Evaluation of these alternative policies could be the subject of further 
research. 
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